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THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT:




Bob Rabin is an icon on the modern academic tort scene. He has,
for over forty years, illuminated this area for legions of students, law-
yers, judges, and academics. Bob's rigor, curiosity, balance, and plain
prose make his work a pleasure to read. But his insight-making con-
nections that elude the rest of us, teasing from historical evidence new
understanding-is what makes his work so wonderful and educa-
tional. I learned torts at Bob's feet-his casebook was the one that I
chose for the first torts class I taught, and I continue to use it over
thirty years later.'
While I have admired Bob's academic work for a long time, I have
been privileged over the past ten years to work closely with him in
preparing two editions of his torts casebook.2 That experience has
afforded an opportunity to observe a very different dimension of Bob
Rabin, one that has deepened my respect for him and produced a
strong affection. To paraphrase Spike Lee, he is maniacal about doing
the right thing and assuring, no matter how much work it takes, that
his work product has integrity, heft, and his full commitment. There is
no fluff in Bob's professional work.
I do not want to stop there, though. Bob is warm, generous, and
Uber reliable. He has a wonderful sense of humor, and his distaste for
pedantry and pretension dovetails his own humility and lack of affect.
He is, in short, the ideal collaborator, and I consider myself most for-
tunate to have had the opportunity to work with him over the past
decade.
Bob has never limited his academic interest to tort law. He has
explored alternatives to torts and written about virtually all of the
* Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University.
1. MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNA-
TIVES (9th ed. 2011).
2. With his typical graciousness (and nit-picking attention to detail), Bob corrected me to
point out that it was now our casebook.
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targeted compensation schemes adopted in the modern era.3 The title
of his casebook, Tort Law and Alternatives, reflects Bob's engagement
with other mechanisms for addressing accidental injuries. Thus, it
seemed appropriate for this Festschrift to address a compensation
scheme that so far has eluded Bob's gaze: the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act (FELA). I am pleased that I managed to get to it before
Bob, with his penchant for searching inquiry into alternatives and the
preemptive wisdom he brings to bear on his subjects, turned to it.
B. The Federal Employers' Liability Act
I have for a number of years been vaguely aware of cases that con-
fronted and often struggled with the Supreme Court's decision in Rog-
ers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. There, the Court declared that
the FELA required only "that employer negligence played any part,
even the slightest, in producing the injury."4 This effort to honor Bob
seemed like the perfect opportunity to explore the FELA, Rogers, and
whether this statute is simply a statutory wrapping for common law
torts or, alternatively, a compensation system in tort clothing that pro-
vides an alternative to tort law. That question, it turns out, is reflected
in the modern controversy over Rogers and the causal relation re-
quired for an injured railroad worker to recover from her employer
for occupational injury.
Although I did not appreciate it when I decided to pursue this topic,
the literature on the FELA has ignored the troubling questions raised
by Rogers and the struggle to make sense of it. Much of the sparse
academic commentary about the FELA has addressed the question of
whether it should be replaced with some form of workers' compensa-
tion.5 The only article that approaches FELA causation is one written
3. Examples include the Black Lung Benefits Act, see 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2006); the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-1 to -34 (2006); the Swine Flu
Vaccine Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-(I) (1976) (repealed 1978); and the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, see 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). Bob's broadest
treatment of compensation systems is Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans
Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699 (2005). For further reading, see Robert L. Rabin, Administrative
Compensation Schemes, in II REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 441 (1991); Robert L. Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, Financial Compensation for Victims of
Catastrophes: United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 303 (M. Faure & T. Hartlief eds., 2006); Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman, The Case for Specially Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Acts: An
Assessment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 901 (2007); Robert L. Rabin, The Vaccine No-Fault Act: An
Overview, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 267 (2011).
4. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
5. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress Should Repeal the Federal Employers' Liability
Act of 1908, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 79, 81-82 (1992). Several stakeholders have written self-
interested assessments of the statute and about whether it should be replaced. See Sidney A.
504 [Vol. 61:503
2012] THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 505
roughly forty-five years ago and that dealt with whether the causal
standard for plaintiff's contributory negligence should be the same as
the one for defendant's negligence. 6
The FELA was enacted over a century ago at the same time that
several states were actively considering replacing tort law with work-
ers' compensation systems.7 The history of workers' compensation re-
form has been repeatedly told,8 but the history of FELA is less well
known. Some, including me, have understood the FELA as necessary
because of federalism difficulties states would have covering employ-
ees involved in interstate railroading, but that is not the case. 9 The
FELA, rather, is a historical anomaly, still in operation today largely
due to legislative ennui and entrenched interest groups.10
The industrial revolution produced a heavy toll on the labor that
fueled it," and tort law was quite unsympathetic to injured employ-
Alderman, What the New Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of Negligence, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 110 (1953); Melvin L. Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 160, 162-66 (1953);
Arnold I. Havens & Anthony A. Anderson, The Federal Employers' Liability Act: A Compensa-
tion System in Urgent Need of Reform, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 310, 310-12 (1987); Clarence A.
Miller, The Quest for a Federal Workmen's Compensation Law for Railroad Employees, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBs. 188 (1953); Jerome Pollack, The Crisis in Work Injury Compensation on
and off the Railroads, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 296 (1953).
6. See Charles H. Traeger, III, Legal Cause, Proximate Cause, and Comparative Negligence in
the FELA, 18 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1966). The Court resolved this issue in Norfolk Southern
Railway v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158 (2007), holding that the same standard applied to both plaintiff
and defendant negligence.
7. Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51). As with
other worker reform statutes of the era, the Supreme Court held the first version of the Act,
passed by Congress in 1906, unconstitutional. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 499
(1908). Congress attended to the problems identified in the first Act that same year and passed
a revised version that the Court later upheld.
8. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY 42-43 (2008); ORIN KRAMER &
RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 1-3
(1991); see also Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compen-
sation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & EcON. 305, 319-20 (1998) (claiming that changes
in tort law favorable to plaintiffs encouraged employer support for workers' compensation
legislation).
9. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 184 (1985) (ex-
plaining the lack of reasons for contemporary maintenance of the FELA). By contrast, occupa-
tional injuries to longshoremen and other harbor workers are necessarily a federal matter to
those workers because of the federal government's exclusive authority over admiralty. See S.
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917).
10. Although my focus is the FELA, the problems I identify are equally applicable to
seamen's suits against their employer under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2006). Con-
gress adopted the FELA by reference to govern those suits. See Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co.,
355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958) (applying FELA principles to claims made under the Jones Act).
11. The toll on railroad workers, as one might have expected, was particularly heavy. One
frequently cited statistic from the late nineteenth century is that a railroad brakeman had an
almost eighty percent chance of dying prematurely. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N,
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ees, with the trilogy of defenses that employers frequently asserted
with success.12 That situation is part of the well-known history that
led to workers' compensation.' 3 Yet, there was another, less fre-
quently told aspect to the tort law of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that contributed to the dismal fate of injured em-
ployees. Courts ruled in cases on factual matters with little deference
to the role of the jury, often without even a nod in the direction of
"sufficiency of the evidence" or whether a reasonable jury could have
found otherwise.14
Workers' compensation systems had been established in Europe, in-
itially in Germany.' 5 The toll of the industrial revolution was no less
in the United States, and President Theodore Roosevelt made the is-
sue of workplace safety a priority.16
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 85 (1889); see also MARK ALDRICH, DEATH RODE THE RAILS: AMERI-
CAN RAILROAD ACCIDENTS AND SAFETY 1828-1965, at 103-07 (2006); WALTER LICHT, WORK-
ING FOR THE RAILROAD: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 190-97
(1983); JOHN FABIAN WIrr, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKING MEN, DESTI-
TUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 3 (2004); Griffith, supra note 5, at 162;
Havens & Anderson, supra note 5, at 310.
12. These defenses included contributory negligence and assumption of risk, which were ap-
plicable to all tort cases of the era, and the fellow-servant rule, which was peculiar to the work-
place and exempted an employer from vicarious liability when the plaintiff was an employee.
See KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 8, at 14-15; Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky,
Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 51-53 (1967) (discuss-
ing the fellow-servant rule).
13. As Bob Rabin put it, "Deep-seated dissatisfaction with accident law dates back at least to
the rise of the railroad as an engine of destruction . . . ." Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on
the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 13, 15 (1988). A less-well-known aspect of
the story is that the harshness of the law toward occupational injuries was in the process of being
liberalized in the run-up to workers' compensation. See, e.g., LICHT, supra note 11, at 197-99;
Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 12, at 59-65.
14. The Missouri Supreme Court provides an example in Rogers, a case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court set forth the standard for causation discussed in this Article. Rogers v. Thomp-
son, 284 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1955), rev'd sub nom. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
There, a railroad worker allegedly fell due to dangerous work conditions at the site where he had
been assigned to burn off weeds on the railroad roadbed. Addressing proximate cause, the Mis-
souri court stated, "And now, after the event, we are obliged to say we think plaintiff's injury
was not the natural and probable consequence of any negligence of defendant." Id. at 472. The
court made this conclusion in the course of reversing a jury verdict and judgment entered on
behalf of the plaintiff, id. at 473, despite many years of (and a large number of reversals by) the
Supreme Court attempting to wean lower federal courts and state courts from the practice of
ruling as a matter of law on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. See infra notes 99-102 and
accompanying text.
15. See LEE K. FRANKEL & MILES M. DAWSON, WORKINGMEN'S INSURANCE IN EUROPE 3
(1910); John M. Kleeberg, Note, From Strict Liability to Workers' Compensation: The Prussian
Railroad Law, the German Liability Act, and the Introduction of Bismarck's Accident Insurance
in Germany, 1838-1884, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53 (2003).
16. See Wrr, supra note 11, at 2-4. President Roosevelt was not the first U.S. President to do
so. President Benjamin Harrison had urged Congress repeatedly to enact legislation to address
safety for railroad employees. Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1904). In 1893, Con-
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In the United States, there was significant concern17 about enacting
compensation systems to replace tort law because of constitutional
provisions protecting the right to jury trial, the right to a judicial rem-
edy, and separation of powers." To avoid those obstacles, the first
iteration of the FELA, enacted in 1906, retained a system of fault but
modified several aspects of common law torts that foiled most injured
workers' claims.' 9 The Supreme Court promptly struck down the stat-
ute, albeit on different grounds from the ones feared.20 Instead, the
Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact the legislation
because the railroad workers covered went beyond that permitted by
the Interstate Commerce Clause.21 That problem was rapidly ad-
dressed, and the second version of the FELA was enacted in 1908.22
Thus, although enacted around the framework of tort law, the FELA
was the product of the same societal concerns that produced workers'
compensation and was intended to accomplish similar goals. In one
sense, the FELA was the first workers' compensation statute in this
country. 23
The FELA addressed the unholy trinity of employer defenses by
replacing contributory negligence with comparative fault, abolishing
the fellow-servant rule, and limiting the doctrine of assumption of
gress enacted the first federal safety regulation. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (codi-
fied as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), recodified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 20302 (2006)); see
also Licrr, supra note 11, at 189-90 (describing its enactment).
17. See, e.g., Liability of Employers: Hearing on H.R. 239, S. 156, & S. 1657 Before the S.
Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 59th Cong. 33-41 (1906) (statement of H. T. Newcomb, repre-
senting the Del. and Hudson Canal Co.) (raising concerns under the Commerce Clause); id. at
164-66 (additional statement of H. R. Fuller, representing the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi-
neers, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors, and the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen) (raising concerns under the Commerce Clause); Wrrr, supra note
11, at 137 (describing early cases striking down workplace reform legislation): Frank Warren
Hackett, The Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908-Is It Constitutional?, 22 HARV. L. REV.
38 (1908-1909) (discussing whether Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to
enact the FELA); Harry Weiss, Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation, in HISTORY
OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 564 (John R. Commons ed., 1966).
18. Indeed, the first effort by Maryland in 1902 to provide an optional workers' compensation
system that employers could opt into was struck down on constitutional grounds. George E.
Barnett, The End of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act, 19 O.J. ECON. 320, 320-21
(1905). Montana followed in 1909 with legislation that was also struck down on constitutional
grounds. Id.
19. Act of June 11, 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (abrogating the fellow-servant rule and
providing that slight contributory negligence would reduce, but not bar, the plaintiff's recovery).
20. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 492 (1908).
21. Id. at 492-503.
22. Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51).
23. Although Maryland was the first to establish a non-universal workers' compensation
scheme, New York enacted the first comprehensive statute. See Fishback & Kantor, supra note
8, at 320.
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risk.24 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held that, like workers'
compensation, the FELA is the exclusive remedy for railroad workers
to recover from their employer for occupational injury.25
In those respects, the FELA marches to the same drummer as the
workers' compensation statutes that followed shortly thereafter.
II. SOME SENSE ABOUT CAUSATION
One should not wander in the thicket of FELA causation without
some framework and terminology as a guide. Making sense of the
morass of inconsistencies, misunderstandings, and confusion that suf-
fuse FELA causation decisions requires a compass for the trip. To be
sure, much of causation law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
relied on shibboleths and inapt language that then found their way
into jury instructions. The causal language in the FELA, its progres-
sive purpose, and the effort in Rogers to effectuate that purpose, how-
ever, set FELA causation on a higher confusion shelf.
Before attempting to provide a modicum of clarity about causation,
I begin with the proximate cause landscape when Congress enacted
the FELA. At that time, standards for causation were quite different
from those discussed in the remainder of this Part.
There were a couple of strands to proximate cause thinking in the
late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. 26 One, a product of
legal scientism, posited that a proximate cause could logically and ob-
jectively be deduced by employing appropriate investigatory tools. 2 7
Those tools came from largely meaningless and nonormative phrases
that sound vaguely objective, such as natural and continuous; natural
and probable; intermediate efficient causes; active, efficient, and pre-
vailing causes; and intervening events cutting the causal chain.28 Note
24. The initial abrogation of assumption of risk was limited to instances in which the railroad
violated a safety statute. Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66. In 1939, assumption
of risk was completely eliminated. Act of Aug. 11, 1939, ch. 685, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 51).
25. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1917).
26. See Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51-54 (1991) (describing a debate among commentators).
27. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Pragmatic Realism and Proximate Cause in America, 3 J. LEGAL
HisT. 3, 10-22 (1982); James T. Kloppenberg, The Theory and Practice of American Legal His-
tory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1340 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)); James E.
Viator, When Cause-in-Fact Is More than a Fact: The Malone-Green Debate on the Role of Policy
in Determining Factual Causation in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1519, 1523-24 (1984).
28. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876) ("[W]hen there is
no intermediate efficient cause, the original wrong must be considered as reaching to the effect,
and proximate to it. The inquiry must, therefore, always be whether there was any intermediate
cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury.");
[Vol. 61:503508
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that central to this investigation was a unitary concept that addressed
both of two distinct elements that tort law recognizes today. At one
time, the proximate cause inquiry often, but not always, produced
what was known as the "last wrongdoer" rule.29 Even Holmes, who
announced and applied the last wrongdoer rule in Clifford v. Atlanta
Cotton Mills, a case in which there was no real basis for holding the
non-last wrongdoer liable, acknowledged that "a man sometimes may
Denny v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 481, 487 (1859) (concluding that defendant's
negligence "had ceased to operate as an active, efficient and prevailing cause"); Christianson v.
Chi., St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 69 N.W. 640, 641 (Minn. 1896) ("Consequences which follow in unbro-
ken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural
and proximate . . . ."); Pendroy v. Great N. Ry., 117 N.W. 531, 536 (N.D. 1908) ("[Plroximate
cause, within the meaning of the definition of the instruction of the court, is such a cause as
operates to produce particular consequences without the interference of any independent, un-
foreseen cause, without which the injury would not have occurred; or, in other words, proximate
cause is the true, probable and natural cause." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Leon Green published a text on proximate cause shortly after this period that clearly distin-
guished between factual cause and liability limits, dismissing the language employed by courts to
address and categorize causes as so much drivel. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE 132-36 (1927).
That nineteenth-century thinking and language still survives-not just in FELA cases-and is
revealed in the jury instruction employed by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas in an FELA case in the mid-twentieth century:
As used in this charge the term "proximate cause" means that cause which in a natu-
ral and continuous sequence produced the event or happening in question and without
which such event or happening would not have occurred; and the act or omission in
question only becomes a proximate cause of an event or happening when such event or
happening is the natural and probably (sic) consequence of such act or omission and is
such a consequence as ought to have been foreseen by a person in the exercise of
ordinary care in the light of attending circumstances. It need not be the sole cause, but
it must be a concurring cause which contributed to the production of the result in ques-
tion and but for which such result or accident would not have occurred.
Page v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 312 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1963) (alteration in original). The Fifth
Circuit held this instruction erroneous because it failed to employ the statutory language requir-
ing that the defendant's negligence play only a part in causing the plaintiff's harm. Id. at 92; see
also Oglesby v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Prior precedent] establishes
that it is not prejudicial error for a court to instruct the jury that the alleged [Boiler Inspection
Act] violation must be a 'proximate cause' of the injury, or that cause which produces the injury
in a 'direct, unbroken sequence' as long as the jury is also instructed that causation is established
if the violation played 'any part, no matter how small, in bringing about or actually causing the
injury.",).
29. See Clifford v. Atl. Cotton Mills, 15 N.E. 84, 87 (Mass. 1888) ("[T]he general tendency has
been to look no further back than the last wrong-doer, especially when he has complete and
intelligent control of the consequences of the earlier wrongful act."); see also H. L. A. HART &
TONY HONOR8, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 277 (2d ed. 1985) (describing the last wrongdoer rule as
a reflection of the view that tort law should provide only one person for a plaintiff to sue);
FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 76-80 (2d ed. 1878) (describing
the justifibation for the rule); Laurence H. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding
Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 124-25 (1937) (describing the evolution of the last human wrong-
doer rule as an aspect of causation and its dissipation in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury); Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 4 (explaining the role that the last wrongdoer rule played).
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be liable in tort notwithstanding the fact that the danger was attributa-
ble in part to the concurrent or subsequently intervening misconduct
of a third person." 30 Yet there was a reasonably well-developed un-
derstanding that any outcome was the result of many antecedent nec-
essary conditions.31 And in the pre-Realist period, Nicholas St. John
Green published an article, though largely ignored at the time, in
which he dismissed scientism and objectivity for determining proxi-
mate cause. Instead, he claimed that proximate cause had to be deter-
mined in light of the purpose for which the inquiry was conducted. 32
Only after the reason for the inquiry is identified can causes be sepa-
rated into those that are proximate and those that are remote. 33 By
the time of the FELA, as Patrick Kelley reports:
Joseph W. Bingham, an early legal realist, brilliantly cut through the
varied and confusing explanations given by the courts to the under-
lying core of the proximate cause doctrine. He concluded, from an
intensive analysis of a series of specific cases, that "in those cases
decided against defendant, the prevention throughout of the con-
crete sequence which produced the damage was within the limits of
the purposes for which the unperformed duty was imposed; in those
decided in favor of defendant, it was not within those limits." 34
The first Restatement of Torts, adopted in 1934, attempted some
modest improvements but complicated causation as a result of its re-
form efforts.35 One could insist that the common law treatment of
causation in 1908 is the only one that can inform what Congress in-
tended in the FELA.36 But because Congress did not adopt the causal
language of the day and because the Court has demonstrated some
willingness to consider later tort standards to inform its interpretation
30. Clifford, 15 N.E. at 86-87.
31. See THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLI-
GENCE 7 (1869) ("Probably no injury ever happens for which less than a thousand persons have a
certain share of moral responsibility.").
32. Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AM. L. REV. 201, 211-14 (1870).
33. Id. at 213-14.
34. Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: De-
scriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1061 (2001) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 16, 35 (1909)).
35. See Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 Nw. U. L. REV. 582, 603, 606-07 (1935).
36. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 164 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.) (stating that the
state of the law on joint and several liability when the FELA was enacted is "more important"
than "the modern trend ... to apportion damages between multiple tortfeasors").
Justice Ginsburg's causal interpretive standard in Ayers is odd. One might think that, as with
other statutory construction, the Court is bound by the statute and Congress's intent when it was
enacted. Thus, the Court would ask whether Congress incorporated tort law as it existed in 1908
and, if it did, what that tort law was. Perhaps Congress intended to have the FELA interpreted
to remain consistent with the evolving law of torts, but that does not detract from the keystone
being what Congress intended when it enacted the FELA.
510 [Vol. 61:503
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of the FELA,37 both for the sake of providing a framework and to
bring some coherence to the FELA, I proceed with an effort to set
forth a straightforward and coherent account of the basics of causa-
tion that might clarify the FELA and its causal requirement. Self-
consciously, but unapologetically, I draw on the Restatement (Third)
of Torts.38
There are two elements of a tort case affiliated with the term proxi-
mate cause: (1) the factual causal relationship between the defen-
dant's tortious conduct and the plaintiff's harm and (2) limitations on
the extent of a defendant's liability to those who suffer harm that the
defendant tortiously causes.39 Simply stating these two roles reveals
that they are quite different functions that we should keep separate
from each other in both legal discourse and jury instructions for at
least two reasons: (1) when only one of these elements is genuinely in
dispute, there is no reason to instruct or submit the other element to
the jury and (2) leaving them entangled creates confusion in legal dis-
course about which element is at issue.40
With regard to factual cause, there really is no viable alternative to
sine qua non, or its less ostentatious synonym, "but for." If a defen-
dant's conduct is not a necessary condition for the plaintiff's harm, it
quite simply lacks the essential connection that is the glue for all tort
claims. Yes, there are problems with difficulties of proof for which we
sometimes make accommodations. And yes, there is a supplement for
but for when there are multiple independent sufficient causes of a
plaintiff's harm.41 And finally yes, the "substantial factor" test for
causation has had considerable sway throughout the United States
largely through its adoption in both of the first two Restatements.42
Nevertheless, embedded in the substantial factor test, at least in the
Restatements, is a but-for requirement. 43
37. See id. at 184 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the
Court should interpret the FELA in the same manner as would a court deciding an uncertain
issue in a common law case).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
The author served as co-reporter for this Restatement.
39. See id. § 29 cmt. g.
40. See id.
41. See id. § 27.
42. The reason for leaving the substantial factor test behind in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, despite considerable popularity, is explained in a comment. Id. § 26 cmt. j.
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965). The first Restatement of Torts
contains a virtually identical section. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(1) (1934).
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There are three important corollaries to but for as the basis for fac-
tual cause. First, causation is not a matter of degree.44 Conduct is a
cause of harm or it is not; there is no middle ground.45 Causes cannot
be weak, nor can they be strong; they are or they are not. Second,
tortious conduct need only be a factual cause of harm, not the cause of
harm. There are always multiple causes of an outcome, although tort
law is usually uninterested in most of them. Third, the idea of multi-
ple causes of an accident must be distinguished from multiple compet-
ing, but mutually exclusive, causes for an accident. 46 Unfortunately,
the history of FELA adjudications is replete with instances of courts
confusing these two causal scenarios, so I tarry to explain. Perhaps
the best way to explain the difference between multiple causes and
multiple competing causes is to utilize two illustrations.
44. There is, however, the exception of outcomes that are a matter of degree, such as happi-
ness. But the traumatic injuries that are the staple of the FELA are not a matter of degree.
With the emergence of diseases from toxic exposure in the FELA mix, those diseases that are
progressive, such as asbestosis, may link to exposures that contribute as a matter of degree to the
severity of a claimant's condition.
45. See Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 630 (Or. 1982) ("In less
obvious situations where the physical course of events is in doubt, if either party convinces the
factfinder that its misconduct in fact was not a cause of the injury, there is no occasion for
allocating partial damages."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8
cmt. a (2000) ("Assigning shares of 'causation' wrongly suggests that indivisible injuries jointly
caused by two or more actors can be divided on the basis of causation."). Notwithstanding the
unassailability (and my dogmatic insistence) of this principle, there is much to the contrary in the
legal literature. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1979); Thibault
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 850 (N.H. 1978); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 429 (Tex. 1984); Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REv. 72, 89
(1942) ("A negligent person is not liable to another unless his negligence is, in some degree, a
factual cause of harm."). To paraphrase Walter Wheeler Cook, the tendency to believe that
causation is a matter of degree has all the tenacity of original sin and must be constantly guarded
against. See Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933).
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. i (2010).
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FIGURE 1: MULTIPLE CAUSES
Defendant's
Tortious Conduct
Figure 1 reveals three of the necessary conditions for the burn suf-
fered by a tort plaintiff: (1) the defendant's negligent storing of flam-
mable material (2) in a place where there is the potential for an
ignition source and (3) the presence of oxygen to enable a fire to burn.
Each one is a but-for cause of the hypothetical burn injury, although
only the tortiously created one would be relevant in a tort suit.





Figure 2 is based on Stubbs v. City of Rochester, in which the plain-
tiff contracted typhoid fever, allegedly as the result of the defendant's
negligence in intermingling drinking water with water for fire fighting
that had been contaminated with sewage.47 However, other potential
causes of typhoid fever existed, and the issue was whether the contam-
47. 124 N.E. 137, 137-38 (N.Y. 1919).
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inated water or one of the other sources had been the cause of the
plaintiff's disease.48
There is one important qualification on the first corollary that cau-
sation is not a matter of degree. It is not, but risk contribution can be.
So we might, in considering a victim of lung cancer, assess the ex ante
risks posed by her smoking and the risk of occupational exposure to
asbestos. We can compare those risks as a matter of degree and even
quantify them; asbestos exposure increases the risk of lung cancer by
about six times and smoking by about twelve times. 49 Similarly, we
might compare the risks posed by exposure to different doses of a
toxic agent provided by different defendants. Risk contribution is a
matter of degree, and, in the face of intractable problems of proving
causation, some courts have employed risk contribution instead of
causation,50 and other courts have used risk contribution as a basis for
apportioning among defendants.5' But this is not factual causation
that is being compared. And while quantitative evidence of risk con-
tribution is sometimes available in toxic substance litigation based on
epidemiology, it is almost never available for the traumatic injuries
that are the staple of FELA litigation.
With regard to limiting a defendant's liability for harm that is none-
theless caused by her tortious conduct, proximate cause is a poor term
to employ.52 The history of its usage to mean either factual cause,
scope of defendant's liability, or both provides an environment in
which clarity is impossible and confusion festers.53 The idea of prox-
48. Id. at 138. This assumes that only one of the competing causes was involved in the plain-
tiff's typhoid fever. If there were more than one, each independently sufficient, the causal stan-
dard would be different. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010).
49. See REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING:
CANCER AND CHRONIC LUNG DISEASE IN THE WORK PLACE (1985) (explaining the relative risk
of dying due to lung cancer for those exposed occupationally to asbestos is 5.2; relative risk for
smokers is 10.9; and relative risk for smokers who are also exposed to asbestos is 53.2).
50. See Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal. 1997); Sienkiewicz v. Greif
(UK) Ltd., [2011] UKSC 10.
51. E.g., Dafler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 611 A.2d 136, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
52. The Restatement (Third) of Torts states: "There may be no legal term in as widespread
usage as proximate cause that has been as excoriated as it has. One searches in vain to find a
defender of the term; its critics are legion . . . ." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 reporters' note to cmt. b (2010). Dean Prosser declared,
"Proximate cause remains a tangle and a jungle, a palace of mirrors and a maze ..... William L.
Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 369 (1950). Proximate cause "is a
complex term of highly uncertain meaning" that "covers a multitude of sins." Id. at 374; see also
Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEx. L. REV. 357, 358 (1957) ("The 'proximate
cause' doctrine, with all of its variations in meaning, is the most imprecise and most confusing of
all tort-law doctrines.").
53. See JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE 3 (2003).
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imity, either in time or space, has very little to do with determining the
point at which a defendant should no longer be held liable for the
consequences of her tort-consider asbestos defendants who may
have operated thousands of miles and decades away from their vic-
tims. Consequently, I use "scope of liability" in this Article to refer to
a limitation on liability,54 reverting to proximate cause only when es-
sential in describing what a court said or did, or when the context
requires, as with the following discussion of "sole proximate cause."
There are three predominant standards employed over the past 150
years to limit a defendant's liability.55 First, a direct-remote test in
which a judgment is required to determine whether the plaintiff's
harm was directly caused by the defendant's tort or, on the other
hand, was too remote for liability to attach. That test fits more com-
fortably with proximate cause, which resembles directness, in contrast
with remoteness, with its implication of nearness (of something).
While the direct-remote test had considerable sway5 6 in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries and was fertilized57 in the United
States by the decision of the English Court of Appeals in Polemis,5" it
no longer plays a dominant role. 59 The second test is one relying on
foreseeability-whether in some general sense the harm that befell
the plaintiff was the foreseeable result of defendant's negligence. 60 Fi-
nally, there is harm within the risk, the standard identified by Joseph
Bingham in 1909 as one that emerged from reading the case law. 6 1 In
54. No-duty rulings are another way in which defendants' liability may be limited. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (2010). How-
ever, it has no role in the FELA context because Congress did not authorize it and courts have
not adopted no-duty rules for occupational railroad injuries.
55. See PAGE, supra note 53, at 39-71.
56. See id. at 39-43.
57. See id.
58. See In re An Arbitration Between Polemis and Another and Furness, Withy & Co., [1921]
3 K.B. 560 at 577.
59. See PAGE, supra note 53, at 31.
60. It is hard to know whether the ascendency of foresecability in the latter part of the twenti-
eth century in the United States was influenced by its adoption by English courts in a decision
that is popularly known as Wagon Mound. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 388. Judge Friendly reported in 1964, with dubious
support, "The weight of authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to conse-
quences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are 'di-
rect' .... In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Joseph W. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause" at Common Law (pts. 1
& 2), 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16 (1909), 9 COLUM. L. REV. 136 (1909); see also Seavey, supra note 45,
at 90-92. The Restatement (Third) adopts the following standard for scope of liability: "An ac-
tor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct




1942, Warren Seavey described this as the test for scope of liability,
rejecting a role for proximity of time or remoteness in the sense of
intervening events.62 The extent of flux in the test employed by
courts, if not the intermingling of multiple tests in the same case, is
revealed by the fact that in the thirty years between the first and fifth
editions of the then-leading Shearman and Redfield treatise on negli-
gence, it switched from a direct-remote to a foreseeability test as the
appropriate standard for proximate cause.63
Regardless of which one of these formulations is adopted, or even if
one of the less coherent formulations is employed, some limit on lia-
bility must exist. Otherwise, as I observe to my students, Eve, having
been negligent per se in violating God's law, would be liable for all the
illness, disease, and misery that have befallen the human race since we
were expelled from the Garden of Eden.
Notwithstanding that example of truly unlimited liability, in many
tort cases there is no serious scope of liability issue. If a soda bottle
explodes in a patron's hand because the glass is defective, we would
expect the parties to agree that if there is breach and factual cause, no
scope of liability issue requires litigation.64 And if the defendant will
not so stipulate, judgment as a matter of law should be available rou-
tinely. The situation is similar with ordinary automobile accidents.
The language of proximate cause used for jury instructions at the
time when the FELA was enacted deserves some further considera-
tion. That language, attributable to an approach to law whose day is
long past, cannot stand the test of critical scrutiny. What, for example,
is an unnatural, as distinguished from a natural, cause? Indeed, what
does nature have to do with causation? Are there causal sequences
that are discontinuous? I have never seen one identified, although no
doubt they are conjured in jury deliberations brought on by instruc-
tions that employ this language. The idea that a cause must be proba-
ble to be within the scope of liability may have a superficial appeal,
given its connection to the standard of proof. But this issue is not
about whether the standard of proof is met, but rather with the sub-
62. Seavey, supra note 45, at 91-92 ("The fact that there is a long space of time or series of
events intervening between the negligent act and the harm does not prevent liability.").
63. Compare SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 31, at 7, with THOMAS G. SHEARMAN &
AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 29-32 (5th ed. 1898). Another
treatise of this era unselfconsciously contains both a foreseeability and direct-remote standard
for proximate cause while making no effort to reconcile them. See I FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE
LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 89 (4th ed. 1874).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmt. a (2010) ("Ordinarily, the plaintiffs harm is self-evidently within the defendant's scope of
liability and requires no further attention."); PAGE, supra note 53, at 12-13.
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stantive standard itself. Whether tortious conduct is a probable cause
of harm depends not on any inherent characteristic of the conduct, but
on whether the other necessary conditions to produce the harm are
present.65 Very little tortious conduct is, when it occurs, more likely
than not to cause harm-even powerful carcinogens and teratogens
may have a less-than-even likelihood of causing cancer or birth de-
fects. 6 6 To be sure, tortious conduct must likely have been a factual
cause of plaintiff's harm, but that is for purposes of the burden of
proof for factual cause, not scope of liability. Finally, can anyone pro-
vide criteria for sorting efficient causes from inefficient ones? All of
this language is, as court opinions and serious critics have recognized,
so much claptrap, 67 yet with a veneer of plausibility that explains its
persistence.68
Whether a defendant's tortious conduct is within the scope of liabil-
ity is a binary determination. Either the defendant is or is not liable,
just as a defendant's conduct is determined to be or not to be a proxi-
mate cause of harm. However, unlike factual cause, scope of liability
65. See KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 7 (3d ed. 2008) ("[A] charac-
teristic of the naive concept of causation is the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the observed cause and the effect.... Thus, the flick of a switch appears to be the singular
cause that makes an electric light go on. There are less evident causes, however, that also oper-
ate to produce the effect: a working bulb in the light fixture, intact wiring from the switch to the
bulb, and voltage to produce a current when the circuit is closed.").
66. See ROBIN KuNDIs CRAIG ET AL., ToxiC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS 705 (2011) ("The
lifetime risk of contracting lung cancer for smokers is less than 20% and considerably lower for
nonsmokers .... ).
67. See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 877 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (criticizing the syntax of
the instruction that suggests that the tortious act itself must proceed in a natural and continuous
sequence, thereby failing to acknowledge that other causes may also exist in the chain that ulti-
mately produces the plaintiffs injury); Stoneburner v. Greyhound Corp., 375 P.2d 812, 816 (Or.
1962) (Goodwin, J., specially concurring) ("Whether the injury is a natural or probable result of
negligence gets us nowhere."); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTs 26-28
(1963) (criticizing the natural and probable formulation); Eldredge, supra note 29, at 123 ("Nor
is clarity attained by the repetitious utterance of a ritualistic formula about 'natural and probable
consequences."'); Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 5, 18 (noting that the terminology was "abso-
lute nonsense" and "a hopeless entanglement of unverifiable terms and metaphysical ideas");
Kelly, supra note 34, at 1042 ("[Olrdinary jury instructions do not clearly separate the cause-in-
fact question from the proximate cause questions and give little guidance on how either question
is to be resolved."); Prosser, supra note 52, at 424 ("There are probably few judges who would
undertake to say just what this means, and fewer still who would expect it to mean anything
whatever to a jury."); Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 987 (2001) ("[T]he inadequacy and vagueness of jury
instructions on 'proximate cause' is notorious."); see also Shadday v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp.,
477 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2007) (criticizing intervening and superseding cause explanations for
no liability as "legal mumbo-jumbo").
68. While this language has yet to be completely extinguished from current court opinions and
jury instructions, it is rejected in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 reporters' note to cmt. b (2010).
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is a matter of degree and requires that a line be drawn at the point at
which tortious conduct will subject the actor to liability. 69 Thus, "di-
rectness" or its antonym, "remoteness," is a matter of degree and re-
quires a judgment about just how remote tortious conduct and harm
must be for liability not to be imposed. Similarly, harms can be more
or less foreseeable, as revealed by the frequently invoked "reasonably
foreseeable" test.70 Some harms arise more centrally from the risks
that made the defendant negligent while other harms are less clearly
so.71
Thus, a statement that the FELA adopted "a relaxed standard of
causation" makes no sense in relation to factual cause because factual
cause is not a matter of degree. 72 It might make sense if applied to
scope of liability because it encompasses a range of foreseeability.
As with factual cause, there can be multiple tortfeasors who are lia-
ble for the same harm. The reporters are littered with cases that am-
ply demonstrate this rule.73 So what might we make of the term sole
proximate cause?74 It is important to address this issue before discuss-
ing Rogers because sole proximate cause has a. significant history in
69. Thus, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 135 (2008), permits consider-
ation both of the tortious conduct and "the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed" in apportioning comparative fault among the parties. The "causal relation" referred to
is proximate cause because tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm and cannot be
compared. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
70. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 202 (2d ed. 2011).
71. For example, consider an automobile accident that results from a brake failure caused by
improper and negligent repairs by a mechanic. The harms resulting from the accident would be
squarely within the mechanic's scope of liability. Alternatively, suppose the driver had been
able to maneuver the brakeless automobile onto the shoulder and stop it without incident. If,
while sitting on the roadside, another driver ran into the automobile injuring the occupants, their
injuries would be less clearly within the mechanic's scope of liability-indeed, they might be
beyond that liability boundary.
72. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994).
73. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Save for exceptions
which are not here pertinent, an actor whose negligence has set a dangerous force in motion is
not saved from liability for harm it has caused to innocent persons solely because another has
negligently failed to take action that would have avoided this."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMoTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. a (2010) ("[T]here are always
multiple causes of an outcome and . .. the existence of intervening causes does not ordinarily
elide a prior actor's liability.").
74. The term has no precise meaning and has been variously employed to mean no negligence
as a matter of law, see S. Ry. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1932), or the defendant's
negligence is not a factual cause of harm. See Van Buskirk v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d
481, 493-95 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Archambault v. Soneco/Ne., Inc., 946 A.2d 839, 849-53
(Conn. 2008) (permitting proof of sole proximate as a method to disprove the defendant was a
cause of the plaintiffs injury). The most common usage is as an alternative to superseding cause
when another's tortious conduct intervenes in a sufficiently unforeseeable manner as to render
the original tortfeasor's conduct outside the scope of liability. See, e.g., Budden v. United States,
15 F.3d 1444, 1449-50 (8th Cir. 1994).
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tort law and frequently makes an appearance in FELA opinions.75
For the sake of brevity and simplicity, I confine this discussion to sole
proximate cause as between the plaintiff and the defendant. We need
not canvass the complications that ensue when there are others com-
mitting tortious acts because of contexts in which sole proximate
cause issues arise in FELA cases. The occupational risks to which
railroad workers are subject are almost always limited to those cre-
ated by their employer and their co-workers. Third parties rarely play
a role in railroad injuries so that sole proximate cause in reference to
multiple parties creating risks can be put aside. Instead, sole proxi-
mate cause emerges when both the plaintiff and the defendant play, or
may have played, a role in the plaintiff's harm.
For factual cause purposes, most invocations of sole proximate
cause are at best confusing due to their indirection. Remember that
there are always multiple causes of tortious harm, and there is no ba-
sis, other than on noncausal grounds, to identify one as the sole fac-
tual cause. The one circumstance in which sole proximate cause is
coherent, but entirely unnecessary, is when there are mutually exclu-
sive alternative causes, as reflected in Figure 2 above. One of the mul-
tiple competing causal chains is responsible for the plaintiff's harm,
but only one. To say that the one including the plaintiff's contributory
negligence is the sole proximate cause means that the one with the
defendant's negligence is not a factual cause. Thus, a clearer and
more direct way to describe this situation is to say that the defendant
was not a factual cause of the harm.
For scope of liability purposes, concluding that an actor's conduct is
the sole proximate cause of a harm means that others, whose tortious
conduct is also a factual cause of the harm, are not liable for the harm.
The same judgment is involved when a superseding cause is said to
avoid the earlier tortfeasor's liability-often couched in gibberish
about "cutting the causal chain," and thereby invoking a term that
looks faintly like factual cause. 76
During the era when contributory negligence constituted a com-
plete defense, tagging a plaintiff's negligent conduct as the sole proxi-
mate cause of harm was benign, if imprecise. Plaintiffs whose
contributory negligence was not a sole proximate cause still lost their
suit because of the complete bar of contributory negligence. How-
75. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
76. See, e.g., Budden, 15 F.3d at 1450 ("[T]he district court's proximate cause determination
rests on the proposition that [the plaintiff's decedent's] conduct broke the causal connection
between [the defendant's employee's] breach of duty and the crash and operated as the sole
proximate cause of the accident.").
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ever, the same cannot be said once comparative fault replaced con-
tributory negligence-recall that the FELA, right from the start,
abrogated contributory negligence, replacing it with comparative
fault. When sole proximate cause or its equivalent, superseding cause,
is used to deny a plaintiff recovery, it constitutes a linguistic subter-
fuge for evading the rule of comparative fault,77 which explains why
sole proximate cause has become such a popular defense after com-
parative fault was adopted.78
The analysis above proceeds on the assumption that the harm is
within the scope of the defendant's liability. However, if it is not, then
there is a straightforward reason for denying liability; sole proximate
cause is unnecessary and directs our attention away from a simple and
clear explanation for the outcome. Given its lack of any clear mean-
ing, the availability of more accurate and conventional explanations
for each of its usages, and its potential to undermine the rule of com-
parative fault, sole proximate cause has no useful contribution-and
some detriment-in modern tort usage. 79
III. NONSENSE ABOUT CAUSATION
I entered into this endeavor with enthusiasm, curious about what I
would find about the relationship between tort law and alternative
77. See, e.g., Everly v. Columbia Gas of W. Va., Inc., 301 S.E.2d 165, 166-68 (W. Va. 1982);
John G. Phillips, The Sole Proximate Cause "Defense": A Misfit in the World of Contribution and
Comparative Negligence, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1997); David W. Robertson, Love and Fury:
Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 196 (1998); David
W. Robertson, The Texas Employer's Liability in Tort for Injuries to an Employee Occurring in
the Course of the Employment, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1195, 1200 (1993).
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996), is the leading case that justifies the use of
a plaintiff's conduct as a superseding cause notwithstanding comparative responsibility, and it is
frequently criticized for that stance. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, Eschewing Ersatz Percent-
ages: A Simplified Vocabulary of Comparative Fault, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 831, 841-42 (2001);
Kelsey L. Joyce Hooke, Comment, Collision at Sea: The Irreconcilability of the Superseding
Cause and Pure Comparative Fault Doctrines in Admiralty, 74 WASH. L. REV. 159, 159-60
(1999). For an interpretation of Sofec that avoids a conflict with comparative fault, see Michael
D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products
Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103, 1125-27 (2002).
78. Thus, in Rogers, there was discussion of the plaintiff's failure to keep a proper lookout
when a train passed by his position. 352 U.S. at 503-04. Perhaps that constituted fault, which
would, under the FELA, reduce his recovery. No comparative fault instruction was given, but
the jury was instructed about whether plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
accident. Id. at 504-05 & n.9. Such an instruction runs headlong into the elimination of contrib-
utory negligence in the FELA and adoption of contributory negligence in its place.
79. The Restatement (Third), after cataloging the different usages of the term and commenting
on the availability of other, more precise explanations, concludes: "In light of the confusion it
can generate, and of the availability of more precise explanations for denying liability, it is a
term best avoided." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 34 cmt. f (2010).
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compensation systems reflected in the FELA. Instead, I rapidly be-
gan to feel the way Alice did after falling down the rabbit hole. My
reaction after reading a significant body of FELA cases was, to bor-
row from her sentiment, "It would be so nice if something made sense
for a change!"80
Much of the confusion and nonsense about the standard for causa-
tion in FELA cases can be laid at the feet of Justice Brennan's opinion
in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., the case in which the Su-
preme Court characterized the causal test under FELA as requiring
only that the "negligence played any part, even the slightest, in pro-
ducing the injury.""' The case, in its treatment of causation, is, to be
blunt and colloquial, a train wreck. It mischaracterizes what the lower
court did, confuses and conflates factual cause and scope of liability,
and appears to let its pique and impatience over the continued failure
of lower courts to respect the domain of the jury in FELA cases to
produce an opinion with a too-casual, truncated analysis and an out-
come determinative rush to judgment.
The plaintiff, a laborer employed by the defendant railroad, was
working to remove trackside vegetation. 82 He was provided a hand
torch to burn the already dead vegetation that was on sloping ground
on one side of the tracks.83 The plaintiff and fellow laborers were
instructed to step away from the track when a train passed and to look
for "hot boxes," an overheating condition on the train's axle that can
lead to fire or derailment.84 The plaintiff heard a train approaching,
took up a position near a culvert, and began looking at the train for
hot boxes.85 Suddenly he was engulfed in flames from the vegetation
he had been burning when the flames were fanned by the train and, in
the commotion and effort to retreat, he fell off of the culvert and was
injured in the fall.8 6
Making sense of the relationship between the facts and the charges
of negligence in the case is an exercise in frustration, even with the
opinions of both the Missouri Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court. 7 My best interpretation of the negligence charged
80. ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Walt Disney Prods. 1951).
81. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506.
82. Id. at 502.
83. Id.
84. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RAILROADS 458 (O.S. Nock ed., 1977).
85. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 502.
86. Id.
87. For example, one cannot discern from the Supreme Court's opinion whether the plaintiffs
injury was due to burns, falling, or both. Id. One must read the Missouri Supreme Court's
opinion to find out that the plaintiffs injury was sustained in the fall. Rogers v. Thompson, 284
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by the plaintiff is (1) that requiring him to work in proximity to pass-
ing trains at the same time he was starting fires created a dangerous
environment that subjected him to a risk of harm and (2) that the
culvert from which he fell was in an unsafe condition-sloping, cov-
ered with loose gravel, and missing a sufficiently wide footpath-
thereby creating a risk of harm from falling.88 In its treatment of fac-
tual and proximate causation, the Missouri Supreme Court did not
address the former aspect of negligence.8 9
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed a verdict and judgment for
the plaintiff.90 In the course of doing so, the court expressed entirely
conventional views of factual causation and scope of liability. Factual
cause required that the defendant's negligence have a but-for relation-
ship with plaintiff's harm.91 In addition to that causal connection, le-
gal or proximate cause (scope of liability) is required, 92 and the court
suggested either a foreseeability criterion or whether, in hindsight, the
injury is a natural and probable consequence of the tortious conduct.93
After assessing the negligence of the railroad in failing to maintain
the condition of the area around the culvert, the court held there was
no basis for a finding of negligence. 94 The foreseeable risks during
ordinary use were not sufficient to require taking any precaution. 95
The court then explained that the emergency confronting the plaintiff
was his own doing.96 This observation had no operative legal signifi-
S.W.2d 467, 468 (Mo. 1955). The harm that occurs is critical to the determination of proximate
cause. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
88. There is also a suggestion that the method of burning off the vegetation chosen by the
defendant was negligent, but the Missouri Supreme Court rejected that, and the Supreme Court
did not address it. Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472.
89. Confusingly, the court distinguished several cases in which dangerous work conditions
were sufficient for the jury to find negligence without stating any conclusion about the implica-
tions of the distinction. Id. at 470. The court did, however, appear to dismiss both the vegetation
removal methods and the culvert condition as bases for a finding of negligence, leaving the
rulings on causation as alternative bases for a decision. Id. at 472. The court only appeared to
dismiss these bases because, among other confusing aspects of the opinion, this discussion occurs
after the court finishes with comparing removal methods to other cases and introduces the sub-
sequent discussion with, "As to the issue of causal connection . . . ." Id. at 470.
90. Id. at 473.
91. Id. at 471.
92. Id.
93. See id. The "hindsight" test appeared in § 442(b) of both the first and second Restate-
ments, albeit as a factor to be considered in determining scope of liability. Compare RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 442(b) (1934), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 442(b) (1965).
94. Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472 ("[Tjhe culvert was not shown to have been unsafe for work-
men in the ordinary use of the area.").
95. Id.
96. Id.
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cance, as the conclusion that the defendant was not negligent resolved
the case.
Next, and apparently alternatively, the court concluded that the
loose gravel on the sloping ground was not a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's harm.97 Seemingly unsatisfied with two reasons for revers-
ing the lower court's judgment, the court asserted that factual cause
was absent as well because plaintiff had not introduced evidence es-
tablishing that any "negligence, in whole or in part, contributed to
plaintiff's injury."98
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision is flawed in numerous respects.
A partial explanation for this deficit may be the Court's growing frus-
tration with lower courts that, for decades, consistently took FELA
cases away from the jury with only a passing nod in the direction of
the insufficiency of the evidence.99 Those courts sometimes did so af-
ter making credibility judgments that were barely disguised and
plainly improper for a court to make. 00 Indeed, a schism developed
in the Court over whether it should continue to correct sufficiency of
the evidence errors in FELA cases or relinquish the error-correction
97. Id. ("[P]laintiff's injury was not the natural and probable consequence of any negligence
of defendant."). Presumably, the court found that no reasonable jury could have found proxi-
mate cause existed for this claim, but, as with many courts of this era, it did not suggest that this
is a factual question ordinarily reserved for the jury unless the evidence is such that the court can
rule as a matter of law.
One thing that the U.S. Supreme Court might have done in Rogers that would have spared
decades of confusion in lower courts would have been to address and resolve whether the FELA
requires proximate cause, apart from factual causation, for liability or whether the FELA dis-
pensed with such an element.
98. Id.
99. The Missouri Supreme Court's opinion in Rogers is a reasonably good example. The court
wrote, addressing factual cause:
And if there was negligence in failing to maintain a sufficiently wide path across the
culvert or in permitting that path to become covered with crushed rock or gravel, still
plaintiff's evidence is completely lacking in probative facts supporting a conclusion that
defendant's negligence, in whole or in part, contributed to plaintiffs injury.
Id. "Direct evidence" of causation there was not, but causation often requires inference, and an
inference from conditions that created a risk of falling could have supported a jury verdict.
100. Thus, in its opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court quoted the plaintiffs testimony con-
tained in the record and observed its inconsistency:
Plaintiff's testimony, which we have quoted in question and answer form, supra, was
support for a conclusion that plaintiff slipped on gravel "right up next to the ties";
however, at another time while testifying, plaintiff said, "I didn't back up east, next to
the rails."
Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472. For other cases illustrative of courts wielding a heavy hand in ruling
on matters that would ordinarily be for the jury, see St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Smith, 19 S.W.2d 1102,
1105 (Ark. 1929); Pa. R. v. Johnson, 169 N.E. 358, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1929); Wagner v. St. Louis-
S. F. Ry., 19 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Phillips v. Chi., B. & 0. R., 227 N.W. 931, 933
(Neb. 1929); Potter v. Atl. Coast Line R., 147 S.E. 698, 700 (N.C. 1929); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Saxon, 21 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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role that had been imposed by Congress initially-providing for ap-
peals of right' 01-but later changed to provide for discretionary re-
view in 1916.102
The U.S. Supreme Court's first misstep in Rogers is its interpreta-
tion of the Missouri Supreme Court's decision as finding that the
plaintiff's conduct in failing to keep a proper lookout and attend to
the fire that he set was the "sole cause" of his injury.103 The basis for
this understanding of the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion is its ob-
servation that the plaintiff brought the emergency on himself.104 But
this observation is best understood as an explanation of the court's
ruling that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant's negli-
gence-a ground that required reversal of plaintiff's judgment. 105
There was no basis-nor any need-to pin a sole proximate cause tag
on the plaintiff's conduct. If the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause
of the harm, then the defendant was not a proximate cause of the
harm and there is a failure with regard to that prima facie element of
the case. And if the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause,
then the plaintiff's conduct cannot be the sole proximate cause.
Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court never used "sole cause" in its
opinion.106 Finally, the "emergency brought about by himself" lan-
guage was made in the midst of the court's discussion of the defen-
dant's negligence, not in its consideration of proximate cause.107
The fascination with the sole proximate cause language in Rogers
and other FELA cases appears, in part at least, to be an unfortunate
artifact of the language in the statute, which imposes liability if the
plaintiff's injury resulted, "in whole or in part," from the defendant's
101. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 213 (1928) (explaining that the reasons for the
change from mandatory review to discretionary review was "to save the Supreme Court from the
voluminous futilities of employers' liability litigation").
102. Act of Sept. 6, 1916 ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257). A
portion of Justice Brennan's opinion is a lecture on Congress's intent in the FELA with regard to
the role of the jury. See Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508-10 (1957). Justice Brennan's
opinion includes the claim that the Court has a role "when lower federal and state courts persist-
ently deprive litigants of their right to a jury determination." Id. at 510. That lecture is also an
oblique response to the dissent of Justice Frankfurter, who lamented the error-correcting role
that the Court had continued to pursue in FELA cases because of the lower courts' hair-trigger
tendency to take cases away from the jury. See id. at 526 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
104. Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472.
105. On no account was the plaintiff's conduct the sole factual cause-although it was a fac-
tual cause. The circumstances in Rogers were not such that either the defendant's negligence or
the plaintiff's negligence, but not both, was a cause of the harm. See supra fig.2. Both plainly
could have been a cause of the harm.
106. "[Slole proximate cause" was used in the jury instruction. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 505.
107. Id. at 504 (quoting Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472).
[Vol. 61:503524
2012] THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
negligence. 08 If that language is about proximate cause, and its struc-
ture suggests otherwise,10 9 then one way for the defendant to be exon-
erated is if someone else is the sole proximate cause. Presumably,
then, the defendant's negligence played no part in the harm. As ex-
plained in Part II, the straightforward explanation of the outcome is
that defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of harm.110
The language of the FELA, moreover, would not change that conclu-
sion; if the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of the
harm, then the negligence played no part in it.
In addition to its finding of no negligence, the Missouri Supreme
Court decided alternatively that any negligence by the defendant in
maintaining the culvert was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
harm."' After explaining that the fire being swept by the train's draft
and the necessity for the plaintiff to take evasive action with the fire
upon him was "extraordinary," the court concluded "plaintiff's injury
was not the natural and probable consequence of any negligence of
defendant."1 12 Recall that the same natural and probable language
was used by the court to explain the standard for proximate cause.113
The court may have been wrong in its proximate cause ruling, but it is
not because it decided plaintiff was the sole proximate cause.114
Justice Brennan next attended to the final passage in the Missouri
Supreme Court's opinion, providing its third ground-lack of proxi-
mate cause-for reversing plaintiff's judgment:
And if there was negligence in failing to maintain a sufficiently wide
path across the culvert or in permitting that path to become covered
with crushed rock or gravel, still plaintiff's evidence is completely
lacking in probative facts supporting a conclusion that defendant's
negligence, in whole or in part, contributed to plaintiff's injury.115
Justice Brennan interpreted this language as concluding that the
plaintiff's conduct was at least as probable a cause of the injury as the
negligence of the defendant. That interpretation would only be ap-
108. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 115-26.
110. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
111. Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 470-72. The proximate cause aspect of the court's decision might
be read as an alternative ground to the court's finding insufficient evidence of any negligence. by
defendant.
112. Id. at 472.
113. Id. at 471-72.
114. The trial court's use of sole proximate cause with regard to the plaintiffs negligence in its
instructions ran afoul of Congress's adoption of comparative fault for FELA actions. See Act of
Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53). But that error was harmless, as
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Thus, instructional error was not before the Supreme
Court in Rogers.
115. Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472.
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propriate if the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct were mutually
exclusive competing causes, as in Figure 2, supra. The difficulty with
that interpretation is that there was no dispute on this matter-no one
contended that the situation was such that either the plaintiff's or the
defendant's negligence was the factual cause of harm, but not both.
Deciding that the defendant's negligence was a factual cause of the
harm did not rule out that the plaintiff's conduct was also a factual
cause and vice versa. Thus, this was not a case in which either the
defendant or the plaintiff was the cause of the fall, as was, for exam-
ple, the case in the classic Summers v. Tice, in which only one of the
two hunters fired the bullet that did the predominant damage to the
plaintiff.116 That being the case, Justice Brennan's treatment of which
cause was more probable presented a false dilemma: the conduct of
both actors could have been causes.'17 With this incorrect factual
model, it is not surprising that Justice Brennan reached an illogical
conclusion: the Missouri Supreme Court's more-probable-cause stan-
dard would require that the jury rule out any causes-the plaintiff's
negligence-other than the defendant's negligence. On the contrary,
in a situation such as Rogers, as illustrated in Figure 1, in which both
the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct could have been a cause of
the harm, there is no need to rule out one to conclude that the other is
also a cause. Yes, in a Summers-type case, as illustrated in Figure 2,
the fact finder must decide which is more probable and that necessa-
rily eliminates the alternative potential cause, but that was not the
circumstance in Rogers.
Justice Brennan's next error was even more egregious than the two
described above, followed from the illogical conclusion explained
above, and led to the "any part, even the slightest" declaration."
Quoting the Missouri Supreme Court's statement of the standard for
116. 199 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1948).
117. Nor was the question whether the plaintiff's burden of persuasion is something less than
the standard of preponderance of the evidence. It appears well established that the FELA re-
quires the same burden of proof as in most civil cases, a preponderance of the evidence. See,
e.g., SEVENTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTION 9.01 (2010); Wright v. Ark. & Mo. R.R.,
574 F.3d 612, 616 n.5 (8th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pac. R.R., 841 F.2d
1347, 1353 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Martin v. Harris, 560 F.3d 210, 216 (4th Cir. 2009) (Jones Act
case); Richardson v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 186 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 1999) (Boiler Inspection Act
case); Kavorkian v. CSX Transp., Inc., 117 F.3d 953, 956 (6th Cir. 1997). That is so notwithstand-
ing the more lenient standard for the burden of production. See, e.g., Howard v. Can. Nat'l/Ill.
Cent. R.R., 233 F. App'x 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2007) (characterizing the burden of production as
"featherweight"); Tufariello v. Long Island R.R., 458 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he plaintiff's
burden in making a showing of causation and negligence is lighter under FELA than it would be
at common law."); Estate of Larkins v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 806 F.2d 510, 512 (4th Cir. 1986)
(characterizing the burden of proof under the FELA as "light").
118. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
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factual causation, "but for" and "absent the negligent act," the Court
characterized it as "language of proximate causation," which it most
surely was not.119 This language, as interpreted by the Court, required
that the evidence permit a conclusion "that the defendant's negligence
was the sole, efficient, producing cause of injury." 120 We might evalu-
ate sympathetically Justice Brennan's incorrect characterization of the
Missouri Supreme Court's language as addressing proximate cause by
recognizing the loose, conflicting, and confusing usage of proximate
cause. But the second aspect of his interpretation-with regard to
"sole cause"-is more troubling; the but-for standard surely does not
imply a requirement that only one cause exists. Quite to the contrary,
the but-for test is such that many necessary conditions can exist.
All of this was the immediate prelude to the Rogers Court announc-
ing its "any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury"121 rule
that has dominated causal consideration in FELA cases for the last
half century.122 The Court also seemed to conflate the substantive
any-part standard for causation with the burden of proof, warning that
whether other probabilities exist is irrelevant once the any-part stan-
dard is met.123 Indeed, the Court's opinion provides additional evi-
dence in three places that the "any part, even the slightest" language
is about the burden of production. The context for the phrase was
significant introductory language: "the test of a jury case is simply
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer
negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury
. . . ."124 "[Tihe test of a jury case" surely sounds as if it is addressed
to judges when considering whether there is sufficient evidence to
submit the issue to the jury. Yet in the very next paragraph, the Court
suggests that the language is about a plaintiff's prima facie case.125
Explaining that many aspects of common law torts had been stripped
away in the FELA because of its reformist purposes, the Court con-
119. Id. (quoting Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 471).
120. Id. (quoting Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 471).
121. Id. A paragraph later, Justice Brennan reiterated, in a slightly different formulation, that
the issue is whether employer negligence "played any part, however small, in the injury." Id. at
508.
122. A Westlaw search in the ALLCASES directory for this language produced 638 cases
from 1956, when Rogers was decided, until November 17, 2011.
123. Does that mean that, even if the overwhelming probability is that a competing cause was
responsible for the plaintiff's harm, so long as there is any probability that it was the defendant's
negligence, the case must go to the jury? If so, then "any part" has morphed into being about
the burden of persuasion rather than causation.
124. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506.
125. See id. at 508 ("The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to
pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the
jury may with reason make that inference.").
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cluded that FELA cases present only "the single question whether
negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the in-
jury or death which is the subject of the suit."12 6
With largely inscrutable statutory language, a purpose to provide
injured railroad employees more comprehensive coverage for their
occupational injuries, albeit one wrapped within a fault-based tort sys-
tem, addled treatment of causation and inconsistent signals about
what the statutory language meant in Rogers, we should not be sur-
prised that the aftermath of Rogers has been a half century of muddle
about factual cause, scope of liability, the burden of production,127
and the relationship of these concepts in FELA jurisprudence. As a
California court observed while struggling to make sense of the statu-
tory language in light of Rogers, "The terminology 'in whole or in
part' is not the language of common law proximate cause, as the Su-
preme Court in Rogers emphasized."12 8
Yes, but then what does the statutory language mean and what are
the implications for FELA cases once that meaning is determined? Is
the language about factual cause, and if so, what standard might it be
adopting? Or is Rogers about the procedural matters of burden of
production? Does the apparent lack of any language imposing limits
on the scope of liability mean there are none? Or is there room in the
statute and Rogers's interpretation of it for both factual causation and
scope of liability?
A. Factual Causation
Perhaps Rogers's interpretive gloss, "any part, even the slightest," is
about factual causation.129 First, note the syntactical disconnect cre-
ated by the Court's insertion of "even the slightest." 30 But-for causes
126. Id. at 508.
127. Some courts explain Rogers as addressing the burden of production. See, e.g., Bertrand
v. S. Pac. Co., 282 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1960) ("The court in [Rogers], however, was not speak-
ing of 'the test of liability of the railroad carrier' (the language used in the proposed instruction)
but 'the test of a jury case.' If the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negli-
gence played any part, 'even the slightest,' in producing the injury or death, then the issue of
causal relation must go to the jury."). A Fifth Circuit case explains Rogers as being more about
"the sufficiency of evidence of causal connection to require submission of the issue to a jury than
upon the propriety of particular instructions as to proximate cause." Page v. St. Louis Sw. Ry.,
312 F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir. 1963). If that is so, then there still remains the question of what is the
standard for factual causation and for scope of liability?
128. Parker v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 70 Cal. Rptr. 8, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
129. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers unselfconsciously treats this language as ad-
dressing the factual cause aspect of the FELA. See 538 U.S. 135, 161-62 (2003); see also Clark v.
Kellogg Brown & Root L.L.C., 414 F. App'x 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2011) (employing the Rogers
standard as a factual cause standard).
130. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506.
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are not slight, nor are they strong, medium, or any other matter of
degree. Either they are or they are not necessary conditions for the
outcome, full stop. Each, of course, is a necessary condition, which
tort law recognizes by requiring only that tortious conduct be a cause
of harm, rather than the cause of harm.x3 x Can negligence play a
part-no matter how small-in causing harm without being necessary
for the outcome? I do not know how, and I can only speculate about
how a jury would understand that language in comparison to an in-
struction that stated the defendant's negligence is a cause if the plain-
tiff's harm would not have occurred in the absence of the negligent
conduct.
At its most absurd, that interpretation could result in liability di-
vorced from factual causation-all injured railroad workers could sue
all negligent railroads, regardless of the relationship between the neg-
ligence and the harm. How could the Court avoid that absurd result
but give some meaning to language that may be designed to dilute the
common law element of factual causation?
Less preposterous than eliminating factual cause, but still unlikely,
it might mean that so long as the defendant's negligence creates a risk
of the sort of harm suffered by the plaintiff, in the absence of evidence
negating factual cause, the "in whole or in part" element is satisfied. 132
That would effectively shift the burden of proof to defendants on fac-
tual cause, and of course, the burden of proof has particular bite when
there is a paucity of evidence on the matter.
Perhaps "in whole or in part" means something somewhat different
from sine qua non causation-an issue that arises most prominently in
disease cases when multiple risk factors exist and the one that actually
caused the harm cannot be identified in light of available scientific
understanding. This is the case with asbestotic diseases, which have
been the basis for FELA actions for some years.1 33 "[I]n whole or in
part" might refer to the risk contribution of the defendant's toxic
agent, thereby obviating the need to prove the unprovable-which as-
bestos fiber or fibers were responsible for the plaintiff's disease.134
While risk contribution is a coherent explanation for the "in whole or
in part" language, it surely could not have been what Congress meant
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. c (2010).
132. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
133. For elaboration, see Michael D. Green, A Future for Asbestos Apportionment?, 12 CONN.
INS. L.J. 315 (2006) (explaining uncertainties about which defendant's conduct played a causal
role in the existence or severity of plaintiffs asbestotic disease); Michael Green, Second
Thoughts About Apportionment in Asbestos Litigation, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 531 (2008).
134. See Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
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in 1908, half a century or more from tort law confronting disease cases
involving asbestos, radiation, cigarette smoking, and pharmaceuticals.
The risk-contribution concept could be applied to traumatic injury
as well. So long as the defendant's negligence increases the risk of
harm that the plaintiff suffered-and it cannot be ruled out as the
cause of the harm-then characterizing its role as having played a part
in producing the injury does not offend the language in Rogers.s35
The statutory language, however, which uses the word "resulting" to
connect the injury to the negligence,136 leans more heavily toward
causation (as opposed to risk contribution) than does the interpretive
language in Rogers of the negligence having "played any part" in the
injury.137 Risk can play a part, but injury does not result from risk
unless the other elements sufficient for harm to occur are present.
Perhaps "in whole or in part" means that other culpable causes are
irrelevant to a railroad's liability, so long as its negligence is a factual
cause of harm?138 That meaning is benign because that result would
occur anyway. That a different person's tortious conduct is also a
cause of the plaintiff's harm does not obviate the causal role of
others,139 save for the limited instance described above. 140 Moreover,
Congress made explicit in § 3 of the FELA that a plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence "shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to such employee."141 But if this were its meaning, the Rog-
ers's "even the slightest" gloss is curious. As explained in Part II,
negligence may be slight (in relation to another party's culpable con-
duct) but factual causes cannot be compared. 142
135. Judge Calabresi pursued this approach in Zuchowicz v. United States, with his
recharacterization of Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920). 140 F.3d 381, 391 (2d Cir.
1998) ("It follows that when a negative side effect is demonstrated to be the result of a drug, and
the drug was wrongly prescribed in an unapproved and excessive dosage (i.e. a strong causal link
has been shown), the plaintiff who is injured has generally shown enough to permit the finder of
fact to conclude that the excessive dosage was a substantial factor in producing the harm."). But
he beat a hasty retreat in Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse University, 453 F.3d 112, 120-21
(2d Cir. 2006).
136. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
137. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
138. A variation of this idea is that the statutory language was meant to abrogate the last
wrongdoer rule. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. This seems implausible, as the
rule had largely died out by the time the FELA was enacted. In any case, this meaning would be
benign and redundant for the same reason as explained in the text.
139. Yes, it might on the grounds that the other party's tortious conduct is a superseding cause
of harm. But that is not a factual cause doctrine but rather one of scope of liability.
140. See supra note 47, fig.2, and accompanying text.
141. Act of Apr. 22, 1908 ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53).
142. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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Most courts do not trouble to ask the questions posed above about
factual causation; instead they endorse the Rogers language for use in
jury instructions and duck out of the way.14 3 The effect of this is to
leave the jury without any meaningful standard for deciding causation
and to fail to inform the jury that, before the defendant can be held
liable, the jury must find that the plaintiff's harm would not have oc-
curred if the defendant had acted nonnegligently. Tortious actsl 44 are
not any part of an outcome-in a factual causation sense-unless they
are necessary for its occurrence. The "in whole or in part" jury in-
struction leaves the jury with no explanation of factual causation.
B. Burden of Production
Or is Rogers merely about the burden of production (or legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence) that the plaintiff must satisfy to establish the
factual cause element of an FELA case? 145 Or negligence? In two
senses, this is a more attractive interpretation of Rogers than the fac-
tual causation alternative suggested above. First, as explained above,
the Missouri Supreme Court ruled on burden of production grounds
both with regard to negligence and factual causation, albeit in quite
different respects. The ruling that the defendant did not act negli-
gently was made not because the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient
evidence of negligence (although that was not what the court said),
but because the court felt that, on the facts, no reasonable jury could
find that the defendant acted unreasonably. 14 6 The alternative ruling
on factual causation, however, is based on the plaintiff providing in-
sufficient evidence to connect causally the negligence of the railroad
in maintaining the condition of the culvert with the plaintiff's
injury. 147
Second, Rogers was motivated by the then-common practice of
courts to remove cases from the jury on sufficiency of the evidence
grounds. Having Rogers move the line between reasonable inference
and impermissible speculation would address what was the driving
143. See, e.g., Summers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1997); Hausrath v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R., 401 F.2d 634, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1968); DeLima v. Trinidad Corp., 302 F.2d 585 (2d Cir.
1962); Hoyt v. Cent. R.R., 243 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir. 1957).
144. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Norfolk S. Ry., 414 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2005); Ulfik v. Metro-N.
Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1996).
146. Rogers v. Thompson, 284 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Mo. 1955); see also Lo Cicero v. Columbia
Cas. Co., 268 F.2d 440, 441 (5th Cir. 1959) (finding that the jury should have been instructed that
the police officer's failure to sound the siren while proceeding to the crime scene was negligent
as a matter of law).
147. Rogers, 284 S.W.2d at 472.
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motivation behind that opinion. Moreover, that is what the Court said
it was doing in Rogers: "This Court granted certiorari to consider the
question whether the decision [of the Missouri Supreme Court] in-
vaded the jury's function."148
There are, however, several difficulties with this interpretation.
First, when the Court wanted to address the issue of legal sufficiency,
it had previously demonstrated that it could say so in clear, unambigu-
ous terms.149 Second, finding the standard for sufficiency of the evi-
dence in statutory language is odd. Legal sufficiency is a procedural
common law standard that rarely is addressed in positive law. And if
contrary to this, Congress did mean to address sufficiency of the evi-
depice in the language of the FELA, employing the "in whole or in
part" language was an unorthodox and mystifying way to do so.
C. Scope of Liability
Does Rogers or the FELA modify common law scope of liability
limitations? That question is particularly tricky to answer for three
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has stated that the FELA adopted
the common law framework for tort actions except to the extent spe-
cifically addressed in the statute. Thus, even if the "in whole or in
part" language does not include a scope of liability element, there may
nevertheless be one from the common law wraparound for the FELA.
But that raises the question of whether the statutory language in-
cludes both a factual cause and scope of liability element. Here, the
second difficulty arises: the nonstandard language in the statute, com-
bined with customary umbrella coverage of factual cause and scope of
liability at the time the FELA was enacted, creates a difficult interpre-
tive puzzle. Finally, Congress has a penchant for enacting legislation
providing a private right of action that contains no mention of proxi-
mate cause or other scope of liability limits. The Court has, on a num-
ber of occasions, ministered to that omission by reading such a
limitation into the statute. 50
A number of courts have interpreted Rogers as having adopted a
less rigorous, or even eliminating any, scope of liability limitation
from the statute. 51 Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., a pre-Rogers deci-
148. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 501 (1957).
149. See, e.g., Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1946).
150. See infra notes 126-57 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Oglesby v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
"any part, even the slightest" language in Rogers "has been read to indicate that common law
proximate cause' is not required under the FELA"). Compare Ulfik v. Metro-N. Commuter
R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that scope of liability under the FELA permits
liability when it would not exist at common law), with Nicholson v. Erie R.R., 253 F.2d 939,
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sion, supports that conclusion.152 The plaintiff's decedent was killed
when a train he was following in a one-man motorcar stopped sud-
denly due to defective brakes, and the decedent did not stop the mo-
torcar before it crashed into the train.153 The train's defective brakes
violated a federal safety standard, thus establishing the defendant's
negligence.154 The trial court ruled that the purpose of the statute was
not to protect those following a train and directed a verdict for the
defendant, 55 which the state supreme court affirmed.156 The U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed with sweeping language that suggested that
statutory purpose (the negligence per se equivalent of scope of liabil-
ity) was to play no role for statutory violations: "this Act, fairly inter-
preted, must be held to protect all who need protection from
dangerous results due to maintenance or operation of congressionally
prohibited defective appliances."' 5 7 Two years after Rogers, Justice
Brennan reaffirmed Coray and proceeded in dicta to extend it to cases
in which fault was based on the general negligence standard.
Among the refinements developed by the common law for the pur-
pose of limiting the risk of liability arising from wrongful conduct is
the rule that violation of a statutory duty creates liability only when
the statute was intended to protect those in the position of the
plaintiff from the type of injury in fact incurred. This limiting ap-
proach has long been discarded from the FELA. Instead, the the-
ory of the FELA is that where the employer's conduct falls short of
the high standard required of him by this Act, and his fault, in whole
or in part, causes injury, liability ensues. And this result follows
whether the fault is a violation of a statutory duty or the more gen-
eral duty of acting with care, for the employer owes the employee,
as much as the duty of acting with care, the duty of complying with
his statutory obligations.'58
One might be concerned (in light of the hypothetical fate of Eve
referred to above) about virtually limitless liability for railroads under
the FELA. For two reasons, I do not think that an absence of any
scope of liability limitation is quite that dire. First, the plaintiffs who
can sue are limited to railroad employees.159 That means that cascad-
940-41 (2d Cir. 1958) (affirming the dismissal of the complaint on conventional common law
scope of liability grounds).
152. 335 U.S. 520 (1949).
153. Id. at 522-23.
154. Id. at 523.
155. Id. at 522.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 522-23.
158. Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1958).
159. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006) ("[Railroad] shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier .... .").
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ing chains of harm that might be visited on others are eliminated from
consideration by this limitation to the FELA. Second, frequently the
claims of negligence in the FELA are quite general-failing to pro-
vide a safe workplace or safe equipment, or failing to adopt workplace
rules that would ensure safety. 60 With negligence specifications like
these, almost any occupational injury is within the scope of liability if
a harm-within-the-risk test or a foreseeability standard were em-
ployed. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell illustrates this point.
Sorrell involved an accident between two motor vehicles driven by
railroad employees on railroad property.161 The two questions were
whether the other driver was negligent and, if so, whether the plaintiff
was also negligent.162 But the specification of defendant negligence
was "Norfolk failed to provide him with a reasonably safe place to
work."163 With such a general claim of negligence, virtually any work-
place injury is foreseeable or represents harm resulting from the risk
created by the defendant's negligence. While the occasional case of
coincidental harm-harm whose risk was not increased by the negli-
gence of the defendant, such as in the classic Berry v. Sugar Notch
Boroughl64-Would go forward, eliminating scope of liability would
not be nearly as great a calamity for the railroad industry as might
otherwise appear.
On a broader level, giving cognizance to negligence claims such as
failure to provide a safe workplace takes the FELA a long way from
its tort analog toward a compensation system by diluting the require-
ment of employer fault.
Notwithstanding the inherent limitations in the FELA on scope of
liability, the majority opinion in Sorrell provides evidence that there
remains some role for scope of liability in the statute. In Sorrell, the
Court held that the same causal standard applicable to defendant neg-
ligence was also applicable to plaintiff negligence.165 The Court rea-
soned that comparisons of the plaintiff and the defendant negligence
necessary for the comparative scheme adopted in the FELA would be
facilitated by having the same causal standard apply to both.166 But
160. See, e.g., Haischer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 848 A.2d 620, 624 (Md. 2004); Sinclair v. Burling-
ton N. & Santa Fe Ry., 200 P.3d 46, 51 (Mont. 2008); Deviney v. Union Pac. R., 786 N.W.2d 902,
905 (Neb. 2010).
161. 549 U.S. 158 (2007).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 (2010) ("An actor is not liable for harm when the tortuous aspect of the
actor's conduct was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm.").
165. See 549 U.S. 158, 160 (2007).
166. Id. at 168-71.
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factual cause, at least the but-for version, is not a matter of degree and
cannot be a basis for comparison. Its only function for comparative
purposes is to determine which parties' negligence is relevant (those
that are a factual cause of the harm) and which parties' negligence is
not (those that are not a factual cause). Scope of liability limitations,
however, can be a matter of degree, as explained in Part 1.167 Thus,
Sorrell suggests that there is some scope of liability content to the stat-
utory language.
By contrast, in a concurring opinion that some have hailed as re-
turning rationality to interpretation of the FELA, Justice Souter read
Rogers as not addressing scope of liability.168 Justice Souter's analysis,
unfortunately, contains several flaws that render it implausible.
Justice Souter's reading of Rogers would enable the claim that the
FELA incorporated the common law principles of tort that were a
wraparound for the statutory language, including scope of liability.
Rogers, in Justice Souter's view, only rejected the lower court's re-
quirement that the defendant's negligence had to be the sole cause of
the harm,169 a requirement, as explained above, that was a straw per-
son for the Rogers Court, in that the Missouri Supreme Court held no
such thing.170 Justice Souter's claim then proceeds to assert that Rog-
ers only addressed the situation when there were multiple tortious
causes of an injury and did not otherwise rule on appropriate scope of
liability limits. 171 However, if Rogers was only about the situation in
which both the defendant and the plaintiff's negligence concur to
cause harm, holding that each could satisfy the FELA's causation re-
quirement, it was such a trivial decision that one wonders why anyone
has paid any attention to it since.172 This interpretation also requires a
conclusion that Congress gilded the lily in the FELA by employing the
167. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
168. Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 174-75 (Souter, J., concurring) ("Rogers left this law [referring to
proximate cause as the proper standard in FELA suits] where it was.").
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
171. Justice Souter made the same error as in Rogers, conflating the multiple causes of harm,
see supra fig.1, with multiple competing causes of harm, see supra fig.2. See Sorrell, 549 U.S. at
175.
172. There are other difficulties with Justice Souter's opinion. He perpetuates the idea that
factual cause can be fractionated, writing:
we held [in Rogers] that a FELA plaintiff may recover even when the defendant's ac-
tion was a partial cause of injury but not the sole one. Recovery under the statute is
possible, we said, even when an employer's contribution to injury was slight in relation
to all other legally cognizable causes.
Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 175. And his attribution of the Rogers language, "any part, even the slight-
est," to speak to apportionment among parties is, well, just wrong. Id. There was no issue of
apportionment raised in Rogers.
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"in whole or in part" language because § 3 quite clearly stated that
plaintiff's fault did not bar recovery but only reduced proportionally
plaintiff's recovery. 73
D. The Effect of the Progressive Intent of the Statute
on Its Interpretation
Might not the progressive intent of the FELA to provide greater
financial relief for the injury and death toll produced by railroads in-
form this interpretive matter and justify more liberalized standards for
factual causation, scope of liability, or both?174 Justice Brennan made
such a claim in Rogers, observing that the FELA was enacted to assist
injured railroad workers before reiterating that the question is
"whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small,
in the [plaintiff's] injury."s75 Other cases have echoed the sentiment
that interpretation of the statute should be influenced by its progres-
sive purpose.176
Justice Souter also relied on the trial court's instruction in Rogers, which used the term "proxi-
mate cause" and required that plaintiff's harm was "directly" caused by defendant's negligence.
Justice Souter found the Court's failure to take issue with this instruction to be an endorsement
of it. Id. at 176. As with the absence of apportionment as an issue, there was no issue about the
correctness of the instructions before the Court in Rogers; recall that certiorari was granted with
regard to the sufficiency of the evidence. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Moreover,
the correctness of the instructions could not have been a basis for review because the plaintiff,
who would have suffered prejudice if they were incorrect, prevailed at trial.
173. Pub. L. No. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (2006)). There is contempo-
rary support for the conclusion that Congress used the "in whole or in part" language precisely
to gild the lily. A number of courts stated that contributory negligence barred a claim if it was a
cause of the harm in whole or in part. See, e.g., Gregg v. N. Pac. Ry., 94 P. 911, 914 (Wash. 1908);
Lowrimore v. Palmer Mfg. Co., 38 S.E. 430, 437 (S.C. 1901); Cunningham v. Lyness, 236 Wis.
239, 248 (1867); Heightman v. Sammons, 107 S.W. 31, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908). This language
was meant to convey that plaintiff's negligence did not have to be the sole factual cause of the
harm. Of course, that proposition was unnecessary given that contributory negligence only mat-
tered when the defendant was also negligent.
174. The Supreme Court provided a more articulate formulation of the premise of this ques-
tion in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.:
[I]n interpreting the FELA, we need not depend upon common-law principles of liabil-
ity. This statute, an avowed departure from the rules of the common law, was a re-
sponse to the special needs of railroad workers who are daily exposed to the risks
inherent in railroad work and are helpless to provide adequately for their own safety.
The cost of human injury, an inescapable expense of railroading, must be borne by
someone, and the FELA seeks to adjust that expense equitably between the worker
and the carrier. The Senate Committee which reported the Act stated that it was de-
signed to achieve the broad purpose of promoting "the welfare of both employer and
employee, by adjusting the losses and injuries inseparable from industry and commerce
to the strength of those who in the nature of the case ought to share the burden."
356 U.S. 326, 329-30 (1958) (citations omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 60-460, at 3 (1908)).
175. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957).
176. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 555, 560-61 (1994); Hane v. Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 110 F.3d 573, 574 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Good question but dubious answer. This inquiry fails to recognize
an important fact of compensation schemes. Workers' compensation
systems all contain a factual cause requirement. Indeed, all compen-
sation schemes, just like all tort claims, have a factual cause require-
ment.17 7 The causal agent required for workers' compensation is
employment rather than employer negligence, but factual causation
there is. Injured employees go uncompensated with some frequency
because they are unable to make the causal connection between em-
ployment and their injury or disease.178
Moreover, workers' compensation includes a scope of liability limi-
tation as well. 17 9 In addition to employment being a factual cause of
harm, most states employ a scope of liability requirement that the em-
ployment increase the risk of harm. Thus, an employee assigned to
shovel a short sidewalk, similar in length to what they might shovel at
home, would not recover workers' compensation if injured while
shoveling the employer's walk on scope of liability grounds. Some
states have more lenient limits on liability, but all have their limits.180
IV. CONCLUSION
How might the "in whole or in part" language incorporated into the
FELA when it was enacted in 1908 sensibly be understood? Although
not in widespread use, there was some usage of this phrase at the time
in reference to a plaintiff's contributory negligence. The idea was that
no matter how slight the plaintiff's negligence, it still constituted a
complete bar to recovery.181 That usage is coherent and a reasonable
account of how contributory negligence works. Comparative negli-
177. See Rabin, supra note 13, at 22.
178. See, e.g., King v. Vt. Am. Corp., 664 So. 2d 214, 217 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994); Liberty Nw.
Ins. Corp. v. Spurgeon, 820 P.2d 851, 852 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
179. See 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 4.03 (rev. ed. 2011) (explaining risks that cannot be determined to be purely employment or
personal).
180. See id. § 3.05 (explaining the most liberal causation requirement, one that requires only
that employment put plaintiff in a position that permitted risk to cause harm).
181. Rietveld v. Wabash R., 105 N.W. 515, 517 (Iowa 1906) ("[T]he plaintiff's negligence must
be such as contributes proximately to his injury; but, if it does so in whole or in part, in any
manner or to any degree, there can be no recovery . . . ."); Zeratsky v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry., 123
N.W. 904, 907 (Wis. 1909) (applying a statute that adopted modified comparative fault, stating
that recovery could be had when an injury was caused by the railroad's negligence in whole or
greater part than the negligence of the plaintiff); Bolin v. Chi., St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 84 N.W. 446,
446 (Wis. 1900) ("In an action to recover damages claimed to have been caused by actionable
negligence of the defendant, contributory negligence of the plaintiff, however slight, precludes
his recovering damages, notwithstanding negligence of the defendant, however great, contrib-
uted thereto."); Potter v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 21 Wis. 377, 382 (1867) ("Negligence, proximate or
contributing to the injury, however slight, prevents recovery.").
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gence reveals that we can, and do, assess negligence or culpability on a
spectrum and that, at least in comparison to others', a plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence may be slight or whole, although the latter usage
implies no negligence by the defendant.182 To be sure, there was a
substantial body of case law that used "in whole or in part" in a simi-
lar head-scratching manner to Rogers.'83 However, if we are trying to
determine the best meaning for a statute, I do not know why, as an
interpretive matter, we would feel bound to take such usage into ac-
count. But finding a coherent meaning for "in whole or in part" with
regard to a plaintiff's contributory negligence is of no assistance in
how to interpret its meaning in the FELA, where it cannot have that
meaning. Recall that the FELA replaced contributory negligence
with comparative fault, so that slight negligence by a plaintiff did not
bar his claim. Equally tellingly, the "in whole or in part" language
does not address the plaintiff's contributory negligence, but rather ad-
dresses the relationship between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's harm.
One might have hoped that CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride,18 4
a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, would clear away much
of the confused underbrush left by Rogers and clarify a number of
aspects about causation under the FELA. A list of aspirations for
what McBride might have accomplished include the following. First,
the Court might have insisted that factual causation be distinguished
from scope of liability in thought, vocabulary, and jury instructions.
Along with this conceptual clarification, terminologically, proximate
cause might have been jettisoned from the FELA lexicon.
Second, the Court might have made plain that the plaintiff has the
burden of proof to establish that the defendant's negligence was a nec-
essary condition/but for/without which/sine qua non (take your pick)
of the plaintiff's harm. Whatever "in whole or in part" means, it can-
not mean something less than this connection between negligence and
harm. Ameliorative doctrines may be developed when proof is not
182. Similarly, the term could be used coherently to address whether the fault of one of multi-
ple defendants was sufficient to subject that defendant to liability but that usage was considera-
bly less common.
183. See, e.g., Cooper v. Ga., C. N. Ry., 39 S.E. 543, 545 (S.C. 1901) ("[C]ontributory negli-
gence must have in it the element of being a proximate cause,-not a remote cause, but a proxi-
mate cause from which the accident or injury, in whole or in part, directly and immediately
resulted.. . ."); Rosevear v. Borough of Osceola Mills, 32 A. 548, 552 (Pa. 1895) ("[Plaintiff] can
recover if her present condition, either in whole or in part, is the proximate result of [the] in-
jury."); N.Y., Chi. & St. L. R.R. v. Perigeuy, 37 N.E. 976, 977 (Ind. 1894) ("Negligence is contrib-
utory when, and only when, it directly and proximately induces the injury, in whole or in part."
(quoting Bostwick v. Minn. & P. Ry., 51 N.W. 781, 785 (N.D. 1892))).
184. 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011).
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readily or practically available to the plaintiff, including shifting the
burden of proof or employing risk contribution instead of factual cau-
sation, but those ameliorative devices would be limited to cases in
which the circumstances warrant the use of these doctrines.
Third, we could hope that the Court would decide whether, within
the FELA's statutory language, there is room for some scope of liabil-
ity limitation on a defendant's liability. This is a common problem
because legislators frequently omit any language addressing this issue,
requiring some backfilling by courts, as the Supreme Court has done
for other federal statutes. 185 If the Court decided that some limitation
applies, it should then identify which one of the extant standards
should be used. At the same time, it should put in a permanent rest-
ing place the empty language that has littered the proximate cause
landscape since the concept first emerged in tort law. 186 The Court,
then, would have been free to effectuate both the purpose of the
FELA and the "in whole or in part" statutory language and to modify
and diminish the common law scope of liability standard, thereby ex-
tending liability for negligently caused harm to a broader range of
harms than would be permitted under the common law standard.
Finally, the Court might have confronted and resolved the effect of
the "in whole or in part" language on the burden of production with
regard to factual cause. I focus on the burden of production because
it is entirely plausible, at least to me, that what Congress (and the
Supreme Court in Rogers) meant to do was to ease the burden of
proof for injured railroad workers in cases, in which the factual causal
connection between employer negligence and employee harm was un-
certain. Those cases required deeper inferences than courts at the
time permitted juries to draw, resulting in a ruling as a matter of law
with the explanation that any determination of causation would have
entailed impermissible speculation by the jury.
That is an expansive wish list for one case to accomplish. But these
goals were not out of reach, and leaving the FELA and lower courts
that regularly deal with it a clear conceptual structure was more than
overdue after over a half century of Rogers's difficulties.
The defendant in McBride, who had suffered an adverse judgment,
claimed that Rogers did not address whether scope of liability was a
necessary element of an FELA claim.'87 Instead, picking up on the
185. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-46 (2005) (securities fraud);
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1992) (RICO); Associated Gen. Con-
tractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529-35 (1983) (antitrust).
186. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
187. See McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2633.
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suggestion of Justice Souter in Sorrell, the defendant argued that Rog-
ers was only about cases in which there were multiple tortious (includ-
ing the plaintiff's) acts.188 Thus, the defendant argued that the Court
should rule that proximate cause was an element of an FELA claim
and that the failure to instruct the jury on proximate cause was erro-
neous. 18 9 The court of appeals held that the instruction employed, a
paraphrase of language from Rogers, was correct and affirmed the
plaintiff's judgment.190
Thus, unfortunately, the way the issue was framed in the Supreme
Court entailed parsing Rogers to determine whether it addressed and
resolved the existence of a scope of liability requirement and, if so, its
content. Both the majority and dissent fell for the bait, and both at-
tempted to read and interpret Rogers to support their conflicting
views. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, rejected the
defendant's claim that Rogers and its "played any part, even the
slightest" language did not address scope of liability and concluded
that that language, without supplementation about any scope of liabil-
ity limitation, was proper to employ in jury instructions in FELA
cases.191 In the course of doing so, Justice Ginsburg perpetuated
much of Justice Brennan's erroneous attribution of what the Missouri
Supreme Court did in Rogers and engaged in the same conflation of
the burden of production and scope of liability.192
Justice Ginsburg did accomplish several of the goals set out above,
criticizing much of the language that has been used as a test of proxi-
mate cause and explaining that the term itself is confusing to jurors.193
In sanctioning the jury instruction employed by the lower court, both
188. See id. at 2637.
189. Defendant argued for different versions of language to be used in jury instructions. See
id. at 2635.
190. Id. at 2635-36.
191. Id. at 2641.
192. Justice Roberts, in dissent, claiming that Rogers was only about the role of plaintiff's fault
in relation to defendant's fault, had to read into the Rogers's opinion resolution of several issues
that just did not arise in the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion, but that the Supreme Court
addressed (1) that plaintiff's conduct was the sole cause of harm; (2) that "cause" in FELA cases
is not limited to a single or last cause; and (3) that Rogers involved a causal situation where only
one of two alternative potential causes was the actual cause (like Figure 2). He was also cor-
nered into reiterating Justice Souter's implausible theory about what Rogers decided and why
Congress employed the "in whole or in part" language in the FELA. See also supra notes
168-72 and accompanying text.
193. McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2642. But this portion of her opinion did not express a majority
view as Justice Thomas, without opinion or explanation, failed to join this section of the 5-4
majority opinion. Id. at 2634. The dissent was oblivious to terminology, advocating a "proxi-
mate cause" requirement for FELA cases and suggesting, among others, a "natural or probable
consequence" test. Id. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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proximate cause and its unfortunate linguistic explanations have been
banished from the FELA.194 The Court also adopted a limitation on
the scope of liability, but in an unsatisfying manner.
The scope of liability limitation adopted by Justice Ginsburg is one
about which the jury will not be instructed. Instead, she wrote that
with instructions on negligence and causation, jurors, using their com-
mon sense, "would have no warrant to award damages in far out 'but
for' scenarios." 195 Citing approvingly at least one case in which a
court ruled as a matter of law that scope of liability was absent, the
majority reintroduced a scope of liability requirement that will be en-
forced by judges as a matter of law. Those courts at least will have the
vague guidance to avoid "far out" factual scenarios, 196 but jurors
would have to divine this from a "played a part-no matter how
small" (or similar) instruction.197
194. The dissent not only embraced proximate cause terminology, but also inadvertently pro-
vided an object lesson in why it should be discarded. In the course of arguing that, before Rog-
ers, the Supreme Court had understood that proximate cause was an FELA requirement, the
dissent cited several cases that stated or implied "proximate cause" was an element. Id. at
2647-48 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The difficulty is that in at least some of them it is unclear
whether the Court was referring to scope of liability or factual cause. Id. (citing and quoting
Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 435 (1949) ("[I1f the jury determines that
the defendant's breach is a 'contributory proximate cause' of injury, it may find for the plain-
tiff."); O'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 394 (1949) ("[P]laintiff was entitled
to a[n] . . . instruction . . . which rendered defendant liable for injuries proximately resulting
therefrom.")).
Even worse, while mustering state courts that agree that proximate cause is required for
FELA liability, the dissent cites a case in which it is clear that what the court meant was factual
cause and not scope of liability. See id. at 2650 (citing and quoting Gardner v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
498 S.E.2d 473, 483 (W. Va. 1997)). In addition, while criticizing the majority for its discussion of
reasonable foreseeability as a limit on FELA liability-because foreseeability of harm is initially
a matter bearing on negligence-the dissent cited a case in support of its proposition that dis-
cusses reasonable foreseeability in the same context. See id. (citing and quoting Marazzato v.
Burlington N. R.R., 817 P.2d 672, 675 (Mont. 1991)).
195. McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2643.
196. "Far out 'but for' scenarios" is a less than optimal scope of liability standard, in any case.
Harm may occur due to an unusual concatenation of events, but if the harm is reasonably fore-
seeable or it results from the risks that made the defendant negligent, liability should follow. See
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. o (2010).
197. The dissent, appropriately in my view, criticized this aspect of the majority opinion, along
with its treatment of foreseeability, explained in the next paragraph of the text:
In one respect the Court's test is needlessly rigid. If courts must instruct juries on
foreseeability as an aspect of negligence, why not instruct them on foreseeability as an
aspect of causation? And if the jury is simply supposed to intuit that there should also
be limits on the legal chain of causation-and that "but for" cause is not enough-why
hide the ball? Why not simply tell the jury? Finally, if the Court intends "foreseeabil-
ity of harm" to be a kind of poorman's proximate cause, then where does the Court
find that requirement in the test Rogers-or FELA-prescribes? Could it be derived
from the common law?
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Finally, suggesting that the requirement that foreseeability exist for
negligence to be established somehow assists in limiting the scope of
liability nourishes confusion and encourages collapsing different doc-
trinal elements. The foreseeability that is required for a finding of
negligence is a separate matter from foreseeability as a limit on scope
of liability. It may be entirely foreseeable that defective brakes on a
locomotive would result in a train crash (and thereby support a find-
ing of railroad negligence) but unforeseeable that an employee would
be bitten by a tsetse fly after alighting from the train once it finally
was stopped (thereby supporting a conclusion that plaintiff's harm was
outside the scope of defendant's liability).198
Most of the rest of the scorecard above remains unfulfilled. Insist-
ing on the language of Rogers for jury instructions, Justice Ginsburg
neglected to explain its relationship with the but-for standard for fac-
tual causation.199 Thus, a jury might decide that, although it is not
persuaded the plaintiff's harm would have occurred in the absence of
the defendant's negligence, it nevertheless played a "small part" in
that harm. And I believe a court, consistent with McBride, should not
disturb that determination, although I am not sure how it would be
aware of such a circumstance. Finally, the majority said nothing about
the burden of production on factual cause, but criticism on that failure
may not be fair as the sufficiency of the evidence for factual cause was
not an issue in McBride.
Thus, in an important sense, McBride remains true to the animus in
Rogers. It leaves the jury with a great deal of decision making author-
ity in FELA cases-surely more than in common law tort cases. It is
unfortunate that it accomplished this goal only by employing an open-
ended, meaningless standard for causation.
McBride, 131 S. Ct. at 2651 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
198. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 925-28
(2005). For a court guilty of just such a doctrinal collapse, see Moody v. Bos. & Me Corp., 921
F.2d 1, 2-5 (1st Cir. 1990). For a commentator making the same error, see Hovenkamp, supra
note 27, at 22-25.
199. The dissent assumed that the "any part, even the slightest" language adopted a but-for
standard and then went on to criticize it for neglecting a scope of liability component.
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